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Abstract. The recent election results in US, Germany, Japan and China and vote for 
BRIXIT in Britian suggest that political outcomes increasingly relate to the economic, 
political and social orientation in both developed and developing countries. Countries that 
have not promoted social and economic harmony in the country - democracy eventually 
puts the pressure through the discontent local polity resulting in election outcomes similar 
to US presidential elections in 2016. To avoid anti-globalization feelings among local 
population and its negative outcomes, improving political orientation towards greater 
participation of local polity and investments in education in developing countries would 
result in more equality. The research is applicable to countries like India, China, Pakistan, 
Argentina, Sub-Saharan Africa who have all liberalised but still need to draw lessons from 
East Asia for their Industrialisation and Growth Promotion with early emphasis on Social 
and Institutional Development.  
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1. Introduction 
nequal distribution of the benefits of accelerated globalisation, since 1980, 
has disadvantaged sub-Saharan and even, Latin American countries in 
terms of either negative or indifferent growth rates (Murshed, 2003). This 
has occurred, despite the fact that most of these nations became more open in the 
sense of rising shares of international trade in national income. Associated with this 
phenomenon of increasing openness is, rising within-nation income inequality 
post-1980. Increased trade, particularly of the inter-industry variety, alters the 
composition of output in the economy away from non-traded goods towards traded 
products. This will affect the functional distribution of income, usually raising the 
demand for the factor of production employed intensively in the traded sector. In 
the developed world, it is skilled labour and we have witnessed an increase in the 
skilled-unskilled labour relative wage premium. In many OECD countries, this has 
meant a more unequal personal distribution of income. As far as developing 
countries are concerned, especially in those that export unskilled labour intensive 
manufactured goods, we would expect a fall in the skilled-unskilled labour relative 
wage premium leading to reduced inequality, since the unskilled are more 
numerous within the population. Yet this is generally not true, and inequality in the 
developing world has risen, mirroring events in the OECD. What accounts for this 
paradox? Perhaps developing countries have such quantities of unskilled labour 
that unskilled wages will not respond to increased demand. This certainly appears 
likely in cross-country studies where China and India are included. Alternatively, 
other less populous developing countries may be exporting relatively more skilled 
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labour intensive products such as semi-conductors or capital-intensive commodities 
as is the case with fuels and minerals. Finally, an expansion in international trade 
may raise the demand for, and reward of, skilled labour even when the country in 
question is exporting unskilled labour intensive products due to skill shortages and 
other factor complementarities. 
Many studies have tried to capture the relationship between trade liberalisation 
and income inequality. A paper by Dollar & Kraay (2004) concludes that 
liberalisation does not significantly affect the distribution of income, and at most, 
the relationship is of neutral nature. However, their results have been widely 
challenged because of their methodology and variable choice. (Ravallion, 2003; 
Amann et. al., 2002) Ravallion (2003) points out that increased openness can lead 
to a rise in the demand for relatively skilled labour, which tends towards less equal 
distribution in poor relative to rich countries. Arbache, Dickerson & Green (2004) 
find that imported technology raised the relative demand for highly skilled labour 
in Brazil and thus lowered the relative wages of less educated groups. Behrman, 
Birdsall & Szekely (2001) observe that inequality has increased in seven out of 18 
Latin American countries that initiated market reforms in the mid-1980s. 
Jayasuriya (2002) accepts that trade liberalisation may have reduced consumption 
poverty in South Asia, but is sceptical about the purportedly neutral distributional 
effects of liberalisation. Many suggest that the distribution of the positive effects of 
liberalisation is somewhat skewed towards urban households rather than rural ones, 
and to wealthy rather than poor households (see Chen & Ravallion, 2003; 
Cockburn, 2002; Friedman, 2000; Lofgren, 1999). The evidence in this regard 
comes mainly from Latin America because most of the economies there undertook 
rigorous reform policies in the mid-1980s following the debt crisis in that decade. 
Legovini, Bouillon & Lustig (2001) find that inequality in Mexico rose sharply 
between 1984 and 1994, and rising returns to skilled labour accounted for 20 per 
cent of the increase in the inequality in household income. Similarly, Hanson & 
Harrison (1999) find that the reduction in tariffs and the elimination of import 
licenses accounts for 23 per cent of the increase in the relative wages of skilled 
labour during 1986-90, thus providing evidence for the role liberalisation played in 
rising inequality in Mexico. Other country studies on Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela, also show that skilled workers received increased premiums after 
liberalisation when compared to their unskilled counterparts. (World Bank, 2001) 
Therefore, the balance of the evidence points to increased globalisation inducing 
greater income inequality.  
Irrespective of the exact nature of the cause of trade-induced inequality, it is 
sensible to presume that nations with higher stocks of human capital will 
experience less of the un-equalising spiral consequent upon globalisation and trade 
liberalisation. Investment in education may yield a double dividend. It cannot only 
promote growth, but also suppresses inequality by both bequeathing skills as well 
as moderating rises in skill-premia following an expansion of international trade. 
More generally, Tinbergen (1975) pointed out that changes in wage inequality are a 
result of the opposing forces that technological change (skilled labour demand) and 
education (skilled labour supply/ human capital) exert on relative wages. Eiche & 
Garcia-Penalosa (2001: 19) suggest that human capital accumulation plays a dual 
role in development. Because the stock of educated workers in an economy 
determines both the degree of income inequality and its rate of growth, making the 
parameters of the demand for and supply of labour crucial determinants of 
inequality increases or decreases as an economy accumulates human capital.  
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of increased trade on inequality, 
and investigate whether a higher human capital stock moderates this unequalising 
aspect of international trade; specifically the skilled-unskilled wage differential. 
High initial endowments of human capital, captured by data on average years of 
schooling for example, imply a more egalitarian society compared to countries with 
a lower human capital endowment. When societies that are more equal, open up 
their economies further, increased trade is likely to induce less inequality because 
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the supply of skills better matches demand. Yet greater international exposure also 
brings about technological diffusion, see Winters (2004), further raising skilled 
labour demand. This may raise wage inequality, in contrast to the initial egalitarian 
level effect of human capital. This proposed study will attempt to measure these 
two opposing forces. Another purpose of this analysis is to examine what type of 
education most reduces inequality. In settings of low human capital endowments, 
as measured by literacy or low primary school enrolment, a policy of relative 
neglect of primary in favour of expenditure on tertiary education may have a less 
than benign influence on inequality.  
We also include institutions in our analysis. Discussion on institutions is 
generally absent in this debate. The proposal contends that here may also be a 
strong connection between good institutions and smooth labour markets. Thus such 
questions are also important: Are more educated societies with better legal, 
political and economic institutions more capable to absorb the upward pressure 
relative ages of the skilled against unskilled? Does the presence of good institutions 
form grounds for technical change with overall fewer distortions in labor market 
returns? If yes then good institutions would be expected to put a down ward 
pressure on wage inequality.   
 
2. A note on theil wage inequality  
The analysis employs theUTIP-UNIDO wage inequality Theil measure 
calculated by University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) based on UNIDO 
2001. This data set is a set of measures of the dispersion of pay across industrial 
categories in the manufacturing sector, drawn from the Industrial database 
published annually by United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO). The Theil index is decomposable (Conceicao & Galbraith 2001). If 
individuals are grouped in a mutually exclusive, completely exhaustive way, 
overall inequality can be separated into a between group component and a within 
group component. Thus, there is no interaction between these two components and 
so these measures are additively decomposable. Moreover of all entropy-based 
measures, the Theil index is one of only two measures for which the weights in the 
within groups component add to one. Therefore, overall inequality is the result of 
adding the two independent components: inequality between groups and inequality 
within groups.  
This chapter employs the Theil index or more specifically a measure of 
inequality in manufacturing pay between skilled and unskilled labour, instead of 
taking measures of absolute inequality, which would capture the personal income 
distribution (GINI). Several considerations motivate this decision. First, 
comparable and consistent measures of income inequality, whether on a household 
level or per head basis are difficult, almost implausible and generally fail to 
provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-country coverage. By contrast, 
inequality of manufacturing pay, based on UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides 
indicators of inequality that are more stable, more reliable and more comparable 
across countries because UNIDO measures are based on a two or three digit code 
of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), a single systematic 
accounting framework. Furthermore, measuring manufacturing pay accurately is 
routine in most countries around the world (Galbraith & Kum, 2002). 
Second, pay is major source of household income. Changes in income 
inequality reflect changes in wage inequality. Fields (1980) offers evidence that 
pay inequalities in the manufacturing sector are the driving force behind the 
evolution of inequality. Furthermore as discussed above, processes of globalisation 
through technological change raises the concentration of skilled workers in 
advanced sectors against unskilled workers in the backward sector. Since 
manufacturing is the sector most affected by modern technological change, income 
inequality would certainly have an inter-industrial feature that would show up in 
changing pay differentials between advanced and backward manufacturing 
industries (Galbraith & Kum, 2002). 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 5(1), D. Mamoon,  p.12-21. 
15 
Third, the principal reason for using the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality Theil 
measure is that the researcher is more interested in the functional distribution of 
income. Changes in the functional distribution between skilled and unskilled 
labour, will in turn affect the personal income distribution in countries that are 
unskilled labour abundant. Inequality will rise as the skilled-unskilled labour wage 
premium increases and vice versa. 
The UTIP- UNIDO wage inequality measure is the between-group component 
of Theil’s T statistic, an entropy measure whose functional form is defined as:  
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Where wT and BT  indicate within-group and between-group inequality measures 
respectively. N and Y stand for total employment and total pay respectively, and 
subscript i  denotes group identity. As mentioned, UTIP captures 
BT  as their 
inequality measure, where groups are defined as categories within the UNIDO 
industrial classification codes.  
Theil is not a measure with a closed scale between 0 and 1 (or 0% and 100%), 
like in case of the GINI index. For resource distributions described by only two 
quantiles, the Theil index is 0 for 50:50 distributions, 0.5 for 74: 26 distributions, 1 
for 82:18 distributions, 2 for 92:8 distributions and 4 at 98:2 distributions. Theil at 
1 is close to an 80:20 distribution, which is very close to a distribution often 
referred to as ‚Pareto Principle‛. 1  The UNIDO-UTIP Theil Index provides 
inequality between groups only (One being skilled and other being unskilled). 
Though the data is not available for within group inequality, we cannot discount it 
because there may also be rise in inequality within skilled labor. For example if 
skills are captured by education level, rising within group inequality would mean 
that returns to higher levels of education and returns to lower levels of education do 
not change at the same proportion.  
Here, we want to capture the effect of education (skilled) versus no education 
(unskilled) on relative wages. We would also analyze effect of higher skills within 
the framework to check if wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor are 
rising also because of returns to higher education are rising at higher proportion 
when compared with overall levels of education. In other words, is wage inequality 
also pushed by favoring higher skills in developing countries, or presence of skills 
(having education) a factor decisive enough to explain rise in wage gaps between 
skilled labor and unskilled labor? There is already some evidence that secondary 
education is more important in alleviating wage inequality than higher levels of 
education suggesting close correlation between higher levels of education and 
wage dispersion (Acemoglu, 2001). Investing in higher education alone is less 
effective in alleviating wage inequality. Since Theil captures wage inequality and 
not wage equality, we can easily test the positive effect of higher education in wage 
inequality. We are not saying that decreasing higher levels of education would then 
decrease wage inequality as is generally true with interpretations upon getting a 
positive sign (say between Theil Index and higher levels of education). If there is a 
positive correlation, then the only way to minimize the education bias of inequality 
is to raise the overall education levels of the population, which in turn would 
distribute skills homogenously within the population.  
The between group inequality, BT , ranges from 0 to less than 1 (0.36 for the 
current UNIDO data set). On the hind sight, this suggests that adding within group 
 
1 This is a special case of the wider phenomenon of Pareto distributions. If the parameters in the 
Pareto distribution are suitably chosen, then one would have not only 80% of effects coming from 
20% of causes, but also 80% of that top 80% of effects coming from 20% of that top 20% of causes, 
and so on (80% of 80% is 64%; 20% of 20% is 4%, so this implies a "64-4 law") [Retrieved from].  
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inequality wT would further add up to increase the value of T closer to 1 meaning 
that over all wage inequality between skilled and unskilled is steeper than what is 
captured by BT only. As suggested; by checking the relationship between higher 
levels of education and ‘between group wage inequality’ BT , we would be able to 
see whether between group inequality is also present. It is possible if higher levels 
of education are more sensitive to wage inequality than average levels of education 
which include primary, secondary and higher.  
The UTIP data set provides Theil inequality measures for nearly 3,200 
country/year observations, covering more than 150 countries during the period 
1963 to 1999. Figure 1 illustrates trends in wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers, over time in selected developing countries and is representative 
of different regions. All the country graphs, except one, show that wage inequality 
has been on the rise in the 1980s and 1990s. The only exception is Singapore, 
which belongs to a group associated with the ‘East Asian Miracle’ of the 1980s. 
However, this miracle remained confined to a few countries and as it is evident 
from the graphs, Singapore is not representative of the developing world. Since the 
1980s and 1990s are associated with Structural Adjustment Policies under which 
many developing countries embraced trade liberalization, it is safe to suggest that 
the above trends in wage inequality also relate to these market reforms. The end of 
the chapter lists all developing countries, and the latest year for which the Theil 
wage inequality index is available.  
Singapore is one such country which invested heavily on social development 
and raised the average education levels of its population. Is this the reasons why 
wage inequality is falling in Singapore post liberalization? In social development, 
Singapore indeed represents the good side of the story. The other side of the story 
is more applicable to developing countries where larger segments of the population 
are un-educated. Over all trend in developing countries post liberalization should 
be a rise in wage dispersion when skill bias technical change raise skill premia by 
favoring the educated over uneducated.  
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Graph 1. Trends in Wage Inequality in Developing Countries 
 
3. Primary analysis 
The initial analysis devised a basic model for wage inequality between skilled 
and unskilled workers which was dependent on integration as well as initial skills 
and have 2 equations (see Mamoon & Murshed, 2008) 
 
Wage ],[ 0SkillsnIntegratiofInequality      
 (2) 
                                       (+)(-) 
 
Here integration represents trade liberalization and Skills represent pre 
liberalization education levels. In confirmation to their model specifications, 
Mamoon & Murshed (2008) find that  
(1)  Trade liberalization is associated with higher wage inequality and  
(2) Developing countries with a higher level of initial human capital do well 
against rising wage inequality.  
This initial research provides empirical evidence that establishes the negative 
role of trade liberalization in welfare generation. One of the primary cause of rise 
in wage inequality in developing countries is also highlighted which is inadequate 
supply of human capital before the liberalization process was initiated.  
However the study had many limitations. First it is undertaken on a cross 
section data which allocates single observation to each country. Secondly the Wage 
inequality equation is very simple in nature depending on only two explanatory 
variables. Third, it does not examine how education is related with wage inequality 
post liberalization. The proposed study intends to extend on the methodology and 
empirical model.  
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4. Data and methodology 
The first step in this study is to extend the dataset from cross section to panel. 
Our empirical model based on panel data would have the following form 
 
],,[ 1SkillsrientationPoliticalOnIntegratioflityWageInequa    (3)
 
 +                     -                                   - 
 
Here Integration represents trade liberalization, which has a positive impact on 
wage inequality. Institutions represent political orientation and have a negative/ 
positive impact on wage inequality. 1Skills captures education levels achieved. 
 
Table 1. Data and Sources 
Variable Description/ Source Period 
Wage Inequality Theil Index/ University of Texas Inequality Project 1963-1999 
Integration Openness/World Development Indicators 1960-2009 
 Trade Policy/ World Trade Map 1980-2008 
Institutions Democracy, Autocracy/Polity IV project 1960-2009 
 Corruption/Transparency International 1975-2009 
 Economic and Political Risk/ International Country Risk Guide 1984-2009 
Skills Average years of schooling/ Baro and Lee Data set 1960-1999 
 Average years of primary schooling/Baro and Lee Data set 1960-1999 
 Average years of secondary schooling/Baro and Lee Data set 1960-1999 
 Average years of higher schooling/Baro and Lee Data set 1960-1999 
 Average years of schooling for males/Baro and Lee Data set 1960-1999 
 Average years of schooling for females/Baro and Lee Data set 1960-1999 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 presents results for democracy. It can be observed that countries that are 
politically stable and that have empowered the local polity through transparent and 
inclusive electoral process witness less wage inequality upon trade liberalization. 
This has generally been the case in most developed countries of the North 
especially the EU. Improved educational attainments all across the sample of 
developed and developing countries also contain inequality in wages. The role of 
politics-as opposed to strict market forces – in the 20th century reduction and 
subsequent widening of inequality is also confirmed by a World Bank Report 
(1993) on eight countries (Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Honk 
Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) which used to be known as the tiger 
economies. It describes how, with well publicized programs of shared growth they 
all deliberately reduced their income differentials during the period 1960-1980. 
Policies variously included land reform, subsidies to lower fertilizer prices to boost 
rural incomes, wealth sharing programs, and large scale public housing programs, 
and assistance to worker cooperatives. The report says that in each case 
governments reduced inequalities primarily because they faced challenges to their 
legitimacy, often from communist rivals, and needed to win wider public support. 
Thus it is in their self interest to strengthen the precedence of democratic values at 
local governance structures that took development initiatives at grass roots level. 
For example South Korea faced North Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong faced the 
claims of China, and the communist guerilla forces operated widely. So here, as in 
the rich developed countries, it is a mistake to think that main changes in inequality 
have resulted simply from impersonal market forces rather than from political and 
ideological processes.  
Table 3 suggests that less than benign democratic setup including outright 
dictatorships have beendetrimental to skilled and unskilled wage equality. Partly 
the results depict the situation in high growth economies in the developing 
peripheries that have actively embraced and promoted free market economic 
policies by opening up industry and services to international competition and thus 
creating an enabling environment for economic growth but could not keep pace in 
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political empowerment of the population. Furthermore most developing countries 
have promoted tertiary education in contrast to school education and thereby 
provided an indirect subsidy to the rich and skilled that benefit from international 
competition (Mamoon & Murshed, 2013). 
 
6. Conclusions 
Political orientation of a country matters in determining the inequality trends in 
both developed and developing countries. International trade is observed to have 
caused wage inequality and that in return has affected the political process within 
countries resulting in change in the policies that have created inequality in the first 
place. For example, Donald Trump victory amid his anti globalizationcampaignin 
2016 indicates that the anti-globalization sentiment was shared by majority in US 
that is eventually resulting in the possible reverse of US initiatives that promoted 
international competition in theory and practice. Same is true for British vote in 
favor of BRIXIT in 2016. In contrast to these examples, the re-election of Angela 
Merkal in Germany and Abe in Japan in 2017 suggests that people eventually seek 
economic equality within the national borders and fair globalization. Chinese 
president Xi has clamped down corruption in the country that was seen as a serious 
measure towards making the elite accountable and thus he was also re-elected. So 
there is a clear friction between national politics and un equal outcomes of 
globalization. In order to achieve higher growth rates, embracing globalization is 
important but it should be coupled with greater political and social empowerment 
of the population.  
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Table 2. Second Stage Regression Results for Democracy 
Dependent Variable: Theil Index 
Independent Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Openness 0.18*** 0.98*** 0.31*** 0.11*** 0.66*** 0.40***       
Trade Policy       -1.59*** -1.11*** -1.52*** -1.88*** -1.27*** -1.09*** 
Democracy -1.04*** -1.02*** -1.24*** -1.99*** -2.56*** -0.88*** -1.19*** -1.67*** -1.03*** -1.44*** -1.16*** -1.52*** 
Average Years of Schooling -0.26***      -0.70***      
Average Years of Primary Schooling  -0.02***      -0.87***     
Average Years of Secondary Schooling   -0.45***      -0.78***    
Average Years of Higher Schooling    0.71      -0.65***   
Average Years of Schooling for Males     0.31      -0.99***  
Average Years of Schooling for Females      -0.67**      -0.02** 
N 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 
F 42.89*** 42.02*** 61.97*** 56.43*** 72.90*** 82.63*** 71.57*** 67.99*** 62.89*** 68.71*** 52.09*** 42.16*** 
R 0.67 0.71 0.82 0.78 0.66 0.59 0.73 0.55 0.46 0.52 0.61 0.74 
Notes:  *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 
1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Second Stage Regression Results for Autocracy  
Dependent Variable: Theil Index 
Independent Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Openness 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 016*** 0.34***       
    Trade Policy       -12.38*** -12.41*** -11.92*** -9.56*** -18.67*** -11.09*** 
Autocracy 0.54*** 0.02*** 0.24*** -0.95*** 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.19*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 
Average Years of Schooling -1.11**      -1.94***      
Average Years of Primary Schooling  -1.67***      -2.23***     
Average Years of Secondary Schooling   -1.35***      -1.80***    
Average Years of Higher Schooling    -1.12***      -1.43***   
Average Years of Schooling for Males     -1.06***      -1.79***  
Average Years of Schooling for Females      -1.67**      -1.02** 
N 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 
F 55.09*** 60.85** 66.97*** 71.43*** 65.30*** 88.43*** 73.67*** 71.92*** 55.81*** 78.71*** 62.49*** 52.47*** 
R 0.86 0.81 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.69 0.78 0.85 0.66 0.72 0.81 0.65 
Notes:  *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 
1993). 
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